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RECENT DECISIONS
Editor-ROSE LADER
APPEALs-FRMER ADJUDICATION-THE LAW OF THE CASE,-

Plaintiff brought this action to foreclose a mortgage. The defendants in their answer asked that they be relieved of their default
which was caused by erroneous information as to the due date of the
instalments. Plaintiff moved to strike out the affirmative defense or
for judgment on the pleadings, which motion was granted, with leave
to the defendants to serve an amended answer. The defendants in
their amended answer set up an affirmative defense similar to that
found in the original answer. Plaintiff again moved to strike out the
defense which set up the inadvertent default as a bar to plaintiff's
action. The motion was denied and the defense sustained and labelled
a counterclaim, to which the plaintiff served its reply. Subsequently,
plaintiff made a second motion for judgment on the pleadings and
the Court held that the decision and order on the prior motion was
binding and that plaintiff's relief was by way of appeal or a motion
for a reargument. The appellant contends that the Court was in
error in holding that the denial of a prior motion addressed to the
sufficiency of the amended answer was controlling on a motion subsequently made for judgment on the pleadings after a reply had been
interposed by the plaintiff to a counterclaim set forth in the answer.
On appeal, held, the Court having passed upon the question of the
sufficiency of the answer upon the prior motion, another Justice would
not be justified in reviewing that decision which was the law of the
case. Endurance Holding Corporation v. Kramer Surgical Stores,
Inc., 227 App. Div. 582, 238 N. Y. Supp. 377 (1st Dept. 1930).
In Barber v. Rowe,' one of the authorities upon which this
Court bases its decision, it was held that an order overruling a demurrer could not be reviewed upon appeal from the judgment entered
in the action where it was not appealed from and the notice of appeal
did not specify that the appellants intended to review it upon appeal;
the fact that a motion was made at the trial to dismiss the complaint
on certain grounds covered by the demurrer, which motion was denied, could not indirectly permit the review of the order overruling the
demurrer. Such order, since it could not be reviewed, was the law
of the case on all questions which might have been litigated, for an
order is as conclusive when not reviewed as if reviewed and affirmed.
This ruling has been followed repeatedly, the courts holding that one
Justice at Special Term may not review and set aside an order made
1200 App. Div. 290, 193 N. Y. Supp. 157 (3rd Dept. 1922).
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by another Justice.2 But see Ansorge v. Kane, 3 wherein an intermediate order was made denying defendant's motion for judgment
on the pleadings. The motion was on the ground that the complaint
failed to allege a cause of action. Such order was not mentioned in
the notice of appeal as being brought on for review to the Court of
Appeals. Pound, J., writing the opinion for the Court, found no
merit in respondent's contention that by virtue of these facts the
Court of Appeals was foreclosed from considering the sufficiency of
the complaint. The decision was followed by the Court of Appeals
in the later case of Vogeler v. Alwyn Improvement Corp.,4 where
the opinion of Lehman, I., states the following on this subject: "It is
urged at the outset that the decision in favor of the plaintiff upon
the motion to dismiss the complaint stands as the law of the case,
since the notice of appeal from the subsequent judgment does not
bring up the earlier order for review. In the case of Ansorge v.
Kane (244 N. Y. 395) we have held otherwise. We may consider
the pleadings as if no motion for judgment dismissing the complaint
had been made and denied before the answer was interposed." 5 It
is interesting to observe that Kidder v. Hesselman, 6 referred to by
the Court in the principal case, was cited by counsel in their brief
to the Court of Appeals in the Vogeler case, supra,7 in support of
the contention which Judge Lehman refused to uphold. The holding
in the principal case merely reaffirms the general rule that an order
by a Justice at Special Term may not be reviewed upon a renewal of
the same motion.
R.L.

BANKS-CORPORATIONS-CONSTRUCTION
HIBITING CORPORATIONS FROM EXERCISIN1G

OF STATUTES
PROBANKING POWERS.-

Plaintiff is a corporation organized under the Business Corporation
Law. By its charter it was given the power "to hold, own, sell,
assign, deal in, pledge and otherwise dispose of * * * notes and other
securities, obligations, contracts and evidences of indebtedness of
corporations of the state of New York or any other state of the
Union." It did not engage in the business of loaning or advancing
money to its customers, deducting interest in advance, and maintained
no office for that purpose. In the regular course of its business,
plaintiff purchased, before maturity, at less than their face value, two
'Aldrich v. Newburgh News Printing & Publishing Co., 70 Misc. 126, 128
N. Y. Supp. 51 (1910) ; Kidder v. Hesselman, 119 Misc. 410, 196 N. Y. Supp.
837 (1922) ; Rieser v. L. Prager, Inc., 157 N. Y. Supp. 118 (1916); Rawll v.
Baker-Vawter Co., 167 N. Y. Supp. 931 (1917).
'244 N. Y. 395, 155 N. E. 683 (1927).
- 247 N. Y. 131, 159 N. E. 886 (1928).
'Ibid. at pp. 134-35.
119 Misc. 410, 196 N. Y. Supp. 837 (1922).
Supra Note 4.

